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Reasonable Separation Agreement Executed on
Understanding That Wife Would Obtain
Foreign Divorce Is InvalidViles v. Viles*
In July 1951, plaintiff and her husband, both New York residents, separated under a temporary agreement entitling the wife to
400 dollars a month for support. Soon thereafter, the husband urged
his wife to divorce him, but she would not assent unless he raised
her support payments to 459 dollars per month. This increase was
embodied in a permanent separation agreement, executed in Octo-

• 251 N.Y.S.2d 672, 200 N.E.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1964).

•
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her 1951, which the husband signed on the oral understanding1 that
the wife would obtain a divorce in the Virgin Islands. The wife
journeyed to the Virgin Islands and, in December 1951, obtained a
valid divorce decree. 2 Ten years later the husband defaulted on the
monthly support payments due under the permanent separation
agreement. The wife's suit to recover these sums was dismissed on
the ground that the support agreement was illegal.3 On appeal to the
New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting.~
The oral understanding had a direct tendency to dissolve the marriage in contravention of New York law; therefore the affiliated
written separation ~greement was invalid.
Both civil and common-law systems accord domestic relations an
elevated status among their protected interests.11 Thus, antenuptial
contracts signed in anticipation of divorce6 and agreements to separate in the future7 are void because they have a tendency to promote
divorce and to disparage the public policy favoring the preservation
of the marriage. This policy is reflected in section 51 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law which provides: "A husband and
wife cannot contract to alter8 or dissolve the marriage. . . ." 9
While the statute would appear to nullify only those agreements that
expressly dissolve the marriage, the New York courts, reasoning that
the legislature wished to follow a broader policy, have extended the
statute's coverage to include all agreements that have a "direct
I. The husband's attorney testified that he was "submitting. this agreement for
signature to Mr. Viles, predicated upon the understanding arrived at that Mrs. Viles
was going to the Virgin Islands for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, and that this
was a condition of the execution of this agreement." Principal case at 673, 200 N.E.2d
at 568. It is not clear whether the payments were to begin upon divorce or whether
divorce was a prerequisite to their continuation. This distinction is not material,
however, as either arrangement would contemplate divorce, and, in either situation,
the wife views divorce as a vehicle to financial security.
2. The residence requirement is six weeks in the Virgin Islands. V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 106 (1964).
3. Viles v. Viles, 36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
4. Van Voorhis, Fuld, and Bergan, JJ. dissented.
5. See generally Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH.
L. REv. 177 (1916).
6. Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177 Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928). See Comment, 41
MICH. L. REv. 1133, 1135-36 (1943).
7. E.g., Hungerford v. Hungerford, 16 App. Div. 612, 44 N.Y.S. 973 (1897); Pugliese
v. Pugliese, 220 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Censor v. Censor, 28 Misc. 2d 702, 208
N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (per curiam).
8. The New York courts have overlooked the world "alter." See Feld, An Appraisal of the Separation Agreement in New York, 15 BROOKLYN L. REv. 210, 211
(1949); Roberts, The Validity and Utility of Separation Agreements in New York Law,
16 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 185, 188 (1942).
9. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 51 (now N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW§ 5-311). Several
states have similar statutes, although the terminology varies. Compare CAL. C1v. CoDE
§ 159. In other jurisdictions, courts void contracts which promote divorce, although
the applicable statute seemingly entitles women to full contractual freedom in this
regard. Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, § 6 (1959), with Morrissey v. Morrissey, 299
Ill. App. 1711, 19 N.E.2d 835 (1939).
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tendency" to promote divorce. 10 As an example, the "direct tendency" test condemns separation agreements that pay the wife substantially more than she would have received under an alimony
award because the higher amount provides an incentive to sue for
divorce. 11 In the principal case, where payments were conditioned
on the wife's obtaining a divorce, the "direct tendency" test seems
misapplied since the arrangement merely dealt with the financial
obligations which would have been required of the husband after
the divorce, and it simply mirrored the prior collapse of the
marriage, at most hastening the legal demise of a marriage which
was already dissolved in fact. 12 Public policy would not seem
offended once "the legitimate objects of matrimony have been
utterly destroyed." 13
The inefficacy of the result in the principal case is apparent from
the fact that substitute techniques were available to attain the
objective sought by the support agreement in the principal case
without endangering its validity. The wife could have established
10. In the Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 38, 47 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943). See
Winter v. Winter, 191 N.Y. 462, 474, 84 N.E. 382, 386 (1908), in which the court of
appeals indicates that the legislature sought to preserve the common-law policy.
Compare 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1743 (rev. ed. 1938): "All bargains which have
for their object or tendency the divorce of married persons are opposed to public
policy." See also llEsTA.TEMENT, CONTRACTS § 586 (1932).
11. Schley v. Andrews, 225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812 (1919); Niman v. Niman, 15
Misc. 2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1958), afj'd mem. 8 App. Div. 2d 793, 188
N.Y.S.2d 948 (1959); Kroll v. Kroll, 4 Misc. 2d 520, 158 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
The support payments in the principal case, although increased at the wife's insistence, stayed within permissible financial limits, thus negating any notion of inducement. See principal case at 674, 200 N.E.2d at 569 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). See
also Yates v. Yates, 183 Misc. 934, 940, 51 N.Y.S.2d 135, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (Van
Voorhis, J.), in which the court said: "It would be unrealistic to require that in order
to satisfy public policy separation agreements must make provision for the wife in
the same form as that in which the divorce court is allowed to do by statute." When
the husband desires the divorce, the wife can often obtain a larger allowance than a
court would award in alimony. See Pilpel &: Zavin, Separation Agreements: Their
Function and Future, 18 LA.w &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 33, 35 (1953), in which the authors
state: "The amount of support is frequently determined, not by the evaluation of
relevant social and economic factors alone, but by the comparative eagerness of the
spouses to dissolve the marriage. Where the husband is the one who badly wants the
divorce, the amount of alimony fixed by the separation agreement is apt to be more
than a court would allow the wife if the question were left for judicial determination. The increased support is the price the husband pays for his wife's cooperation
in securing the decree. Conversely, where the wife is more eager for the divorce, the
amount given her by the separation agreement is often just as little as the husband's
attorney feels she can be given without having the court question the validity of
the [separation] agreement."
12. Physical separation normally admits marital failure; most separations end in
divorce. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS A.ND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACI"S § 31-1 (1961).
l!I. Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 93, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (1943). In contrast to New
York, some courts hold that, since both parties already have resolved upon divorce,
conditioned separation agreements are valid. E.g., Frothingham v. Anthony, 69 F.2d
506 (1st Cir. 1934); Hill v. Hill, supra; Dora v. Dora, 392 Pa. 433, 141 A.2d 587 (1958).
See generally 31 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1943).
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residence in the foreign jurisdiction and instituted suit. Thereafter
the parties could have signed the prearranged separation agreement,
conditioning its commencement upon the entry of a divorce decree.14 The suit's pendency would preclude the argument that the
separation agreement promoted divorce. By an alternative method,
the separation agreement could have been incorporated into a
foreign divorce decree, issued after both parties had appeared. 111
New York decisions hold that incorporation adjudicates the agreement's legality and that this determination is entitled to full faith
and credit in a subsequent action between the parties.16 Thus the
Viles' separation agreement, if incorporated, could not have been
assailed on the ground that the condition promoted divorce. Finally,
14. There is reason to believe that a conditioned separation agreement is valid
provided it is executed after the institution of the foreign divorce suit. In re Nichol's
Estate, 201 Misc. 922, 928, 107 N.Y.S.2d !Ill, !116 (Surr. Ct. 1951). See Werner v.
Werner, 15!1 App. Div. 719, 722, 1!18 N.Y.S. 6!1!1, 6!15 (1912); Hammerstein v. Equitable
Trust Co., 209 N.Y. 429, 10!1 N.E. 706 (191!1), affirming 156 App. Div. 644, 141 N.Y.S.
1065, in which that Appellate Division stated: "In matrimonial actions, brought in
good faith, the parties may relieve the court by agreement, contingent upon the
result, of the duty of fixing an amount of alimony. Such an agreement, openly made
and submitted to the court, is not against the policy of the law, but is in conformity
with the general rule which favors ending litigation by agreement when possible. Of
course, an agreement based upon promise or understanding to institute an action to
dissolve the marriage would be against public policy .••• But after the fact, simply
as a short cut to settling one of the subsidiary issues, there can be no objection to an
agreement as to alimony, so submitted." Id. at 649, 141 N.Y.S. at 1070.
15. The majority view holds that the agreement survives the decree if incorporated
therein; the minority view holds that the agreement merges with the decree. LINDEY,
op. dt. supra note 12, § !11-45. The majority view is followed in New York. Meyer v.
Meyer, 5 App. Div. 2d 655, 174 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1958). Furthermore, a separation agreement may contain a clause which states that its terms will be incorporated in the
divorce decree in the event of divorce. O'Rourke v. Weston, !17 Misc. 2d 73!1, 2!14
N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. County Civ. Ct. 1962). Accord, Kepner v. Kepner, 12 App. Div.
2d 204, 209 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1961). It is best to include a clause that states that it is not
the intent of the parties to -merge the agreement in the decree. Thus the wife can
maintain an action either on the separation agreement or on the foreign divorce
judgment to recover arrears in support payments. The wife risks modification of the
incorporated separation agreement upon the husband's application in the foreign
forum. Nonetheless, New York will not modify the support provisions in an incorporated separation agreement when the divorce forum has retained personal jurisdiction over the parties. Marshall v. Marshall, 280 App. Div. 814, 11!1 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1952)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem. !104 N.Y. 956, 110 N.E.2d 889 (195!1). When the
separation agreement is unincorporated, the validity of the agreement remains open
to question, as in the principal case. Incorporation therefore has its advantages and
disadvantages, which must be measured against each other in each particular situation. See generally Comment, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 1!18 (1952); Note, 6!1 HAR.v. L. REv.
!1!17 (1949).
16. E.g., Rehil v. Rehil, !106 N.Y. 126, 116 N.E.2d 281 (195!1); Snelwar v. Snelwar,
26 Misc. 2d 967, 208 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Graham v. Hunter, 266 App. Div.
576, 42 N.Y.S.2d 717 (194!1). In the principal case, the Virgin Islands decree ordered
payments equivalent to those under the unincorporated separation agreement. In
1961, Mr. Viles brought suit in the Virgin Islands to modify the alimony award.
His success provoked Mrs. Viles' suit in New York on the separation agreement. Although she lost in New York, she secured reversal of the Virgin Islands decision
modifying the alimony award. Viles v. Viles, !116 F.2d !II (lid Cir. 196!1).
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an unconditioned separation agreement might have been executed
had the husband been willing to rely on the wife to secure the di~
vorce, 17 although such reliance seems unrealistic in an acrimonious
and suspicious atmosphere. Paradoxically, the condition which the
husband required in order to compel his wife to obtain a divorce18
also served as the vehicle by which he was able to avoid the support
payments due under the agreement.19
Litigation over separation agreements should be discouraged20
because the agreement has often governed the parties for several
years, and they have become accustomed to its terms. Furthermore,
invalidation of the agreement after divorce leaves the wife without
further recourse against the husband21 unless she either received
alimony under the foreign decree or can reopen the foreign decree
to obtain an alimony award.22 In short, the result achieved in the
principal case is unfair to the wife. In addition, the decision in the
principal case is inconsonant with judicial favoritism toward separation agreements composed by counsel.23 In most divorce actions
courts adopt submitted separation agreements.24 "Even a superficial
inspection of the results of matrimonial lawsuits," wrote a New
York judge, "would suggest that parties disposed to solve the economic consequences of marital failure can reach better solution for
themselves than the court can possibly do for them . . . ." 25 It is
inconsistent judicial policy to encourage the private negotiation ot
separation agreements on the one hand and to limit the techniques
of achieving such agreements on the other.26
17. Indeed, Mrs. Viles denied that ~e separation agreement was conditional.
However, her attorney had died, and the trial court believed the testimony of her
husband's attorney. On appeal, this finding was not disturbed. Principal case at 673,
200 N.E.2d at 568.
18, It might be remarked that an unscrupulous husband can employ dilatory
tactics to coerce the unwilling wife to obtain a divorce. See N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 26,
N.Y.S. JOINT LEG, COMM. ON MATRIMONI!t.L AND FAMILY LAws 36 (1958).
19. The common-law rule terminates the husband's liability for support upon
divorce. E.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 304 N.Y. 956, 110 N.E.2d 889 (1953); People v.
Schenkel, 258 N.Y. 224, 179 N.E. 383 (1932) (Lehman, J.).
20. See generally Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches,
18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 98 (1953).
21. See Duvall v. Duvall, 215 Iowa 24, 244 N.W. 718 (1932) (divorce decree silent
as to alimony cannot be modified).
22. See Bart v. Bart, 182 Md. 477, 35 A.2d 125 (1943).
25. Le Bert-Francis v. Le Bert-Francis, 194 A.2d 662, 663-64 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963).
Sec In re Webb, 160 F. Supp. 544, 550-51 (S.D. Ind. 1958); Collins v. Collins, 48 Cal.
2d 525, 331, 309 P .2d 420, 422 (1957); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 8 App. Div. 2d 341, 188
N.Y.S.2d 455 (1959); Ryan v. Griffin, 199 Va. 891, 895, 103 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1958).
24. N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 26, N.Y.S. JOINT LEG. COMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY
LAws 41 (1958); Pilpel & Zavin, supra note 11, at 34. Separation agreements are present
in most matrimonial litigation brought in this country. N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 32, N.Y.S.
JOINT LEG. CoMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS 28 (1957).
25. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 8 App. Div. 2d 341, 342, 188 N.Y.S.2d 455, 457 (1959)
(Bergan, J.).
26. Compare the opinion in the principal case with the findings of the Joint
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Heretofore, it had appeared that the conditioned separation
agreement was valid in New York since the "direct tendency" test
had been held not to invalidate separation agreements that terminated support payments within an appointed time unless one party
had by then acquired a divorce.27 However, as it seems untenable
to distinguish between a separation agreement that commences
upon divorce and one that terminates unless a divorce is obtained,28
the court of appeals has now seemingly determined that the "direct
tendency" test will nullify both types of separation agreements conditioned upon divorce.29
Contractual latitude is particularly necessary in New York
where adultery is still the sole ground for divorce 30 and, consequently, migratory divorces are common.81 In all such divorces,
Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws which were recommended
to the New York legislature. The findings state: "It has been our law and it was the
considered opinion of the Committee's witnesses and conferees that a separation agree•
ment between spouses which does not concern the rights of children of the marriage
need not be approved. Here, in the vast majority of cases, we have two adults, each
probably represented by counsel, and it is for them to make their bargain." (Emphasis
added.) N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 26, N.Y.S. JOINT LEG. CoMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY
LAws 44 (1958).
27. Butler v. Marcus, 264 N.Y. 519, 191 N.E. 544 (1934) (memorandum decision);
Abeles v. Abeles, 197 Misc. 913, 96 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See Graham v.
Hunter, 266 App. Div. 576, 42 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1943); Yates v. Yates, 183 Misc. 934, 51
N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (Van Voorhis, J.). Compare Lake v. Lake, 136 App. Div.
47, 119 N.Y.S. 686 (1909); In re Hellwig's Estate, 178 Misc. 510, 34 N.Y.S.2d 876
(Surr. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem. 265 App. Div. 998, 39 N.Y.S.2d 995, motion dismissed, 290
N.Y. 743, 49 N.E.2d 1008 (1943).
28. This analysis presupposes that the agreement in the principal case would not
commence until the wife obtained a divorce. The ambiguity in this agreement is
documented in note 1 supra. Of course, if the agreement terminated unless the wife
obtained a divorce, the holding in the principal case perforce overrules Butler v.
Marcus, supra note 27, and similar cases.
29. See In the Matter of Rhinelander, 290 N.Y. 31, 38, 47 N.E.2d 681, 684 (1943),
in which the court states that the "direct tendency" test does not cover Butler v.
Marcus, 264 N.Y. 519, 191 N.E. 548 (1934). The cases cited by tlle majority opinion
in the principal case are distinguishable. In Reed v. Robertson, 195 Misc. 885, 91
N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1949), rev'd mem. 276 App. Div. 902, 94 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1950),
afj'd mem. 302 N.Y. 596, 96 N.E.2d 894 (1951), the wife renounced her right to support
in the separation agreement in contravention of N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 51; In the
Matter of Rhinelander, supra, upheld a separation agreement executed after the entry
of a foreign divorce decree; Murthey v. Murthey, 261 App. Div. 991, 26 N.Y.S.2d 363
(1941) (memorandum decision), afj'd mem. 287 N.Y. 740, 39 N.E.2d 941 (1942), and
Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc. 2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1958), afj'd mem. 8
App. Div. 2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1959), involved separation agreements that contained substantial monetary inducements, void under the rule of Schley v. Andrews,
225 N.Y. 110, 121 N.E. 812 (1919), in order to obtain a divorce.
30. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 170 (Supp. 1964). See generally BLAKE, THE ROAD TO
RENo 65-79, 189-225 (1962), in which the author entertainingly discusses the history
and politics behind New York's severe divorce Jaw.
31. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 116 (1959). The author speculates
that almost as many New Yorkers obtain out-of-state divorces as obtain in-state
divorces. Unfortunately, precise statistics are unavailable. For a provocative sociological evaluation of divorce trends, see Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (pt. 2),
33 CoLUM. L. REv. 249 (1933).
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special cooperation between the parties is essential. The wife normally brings the action, even when the husband desires the divorce.32
Accordingly, she must agree to obtain the divorce and he must
agree to enter a general appearance.33 In the event that the husband
seeks the divorce, as in the principal case, the well-advised wife will
withhold her cooperation until the settlement contains terms satisfactory to her. Hence, she will insist that they adjust their affairs
before she will establish residence in the foreign jurisdiction. In
this situation, counsel need to be able to negotiate a conditioned
separation agreement in order to protect the rights of both parties:
the wife desires a guarantee that her support payments are forthcoming; the husband seeks assurance that his wife will obtain a
divorce. Thus, the conditioning of a financial arrangement upon
obtaining a valid divorce seems important to reconcile both parties
to the separation agreement. Logically, courts that prefer private
resolution of economic affairs in divorce actions should sustain these
agreements as their very negotiation indicates the impending dissolution of the marriage, even before the existence of the conditional
separation agreement.
32. JAconsoN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 119-22. Wives prosecute nearly 75% of all
divorce proceedings. Three reasons are important: First, the wife is more successful
than the husband statistically; second, more legal grounds are available to the wife
than to the husband; third, less social opprobrium attaches when the wife brings
the action.
33. Naturally, parties wish to avoid collateral attack on the foreign divorce decree.
As long as defendant appears and admits plaintiff"s residence, neither party can mount
a collateral attack. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
For discussion, see Lindey, op. cit. supra note 12, §§ 31-68. See also Note, 77 HAR.v. L.
REv. 1531 (1964).

